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Introduction
How tax-bene…t policies a¤ect the distribution of income is a central question in economic and policy analysis. For the policy maker, it is crucial to know whether actual reforms have achieved initial policy objectives and how topical reforms may potentially a¤ect income distribution in the future. 1 Yet, the evolution of poverty and inequality within a country is a complex process that combines changes in the macroeconomic environment, in behaviours and in institutions, and all their possible interactions. It is the role of economists to isolate and gauge the pure contribution of government policies to changes in income distribution.
A traditional approach (Danziger, 1980) is to compare inequality with and without a speci…c income source, e.g. social transfers, and to repeat the assessment at di¤erent points in time, possibly before and after important changes in redistributive policy. This can be done for one instrument or alternatively for the whole tax-bene…t system, should household surveys provide all the necessary information about disaggregated income components such as gross incomes, taxes and transfers. Some analyses also make use of factor decomposition of inequality indices, as introduced and axiomatised by Shorrocks (1982) and extended for instance in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) . 2 However, measuring the contribution of taxes and transfers to overall inequality at di¤erent points in time does not necessarily help to disentangle the pure e¤ect of policy changes from their interaction with the underlying population. For instance, increased poverty due to rising unemployment may be partly o¤set by the presence of social assistance.
It is thus di¢ cult to distinguish this safety net e¤ect from possible policy changes, e.g. an increase in the generosity of social transfers, as both e¤ects make this instrument appear more redistributive in the later period.
in the demographic structure. Firstly, we extract from this decomposition a measure of the absolute e¤ect of policy reforms, i.e. the e¤ect obtained when holding the underlying population constant. This policy impact is assessed against a distributionally neutral benchmark, i.e. a situation where tax-bene…t monetary parameters are nominally adjusted in line with income growth. This way, we capture not only the distributional e¤ect of structural policy reforms but also that of possible lack of adjustment of welfare payment, thresholds of tax brackets, etc. This approach is applied to assess policy changes in Secondly, we use the full decomposition to quantify the relative role of policy changes compared to other changes in the underlying population (gross income, demographics, etc.). 5 We conduct this exercise on Others vary with the method -especially for Ireland where important changes take place -in which case the need for regularly updated income survey data, or representative panel data, is emphasised.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition approach. Section 3 describes brie ‡y the data. Section 4 reports the absolute e¤ects of policy change on inequality in twelve European countries. Section 5 focuses on France and Ireland to gauge the relative e¤ect of policy changes compared to other factors. Section 6 concludes.
A Decomposition Approach

Overview and De…nitions
We …rst introduce some notations and terminology. We denote by household 'gross income' the total amount of capital, labour and replacement incomes (including unemployment bene…ts and pensions)
phasizes the role of counterfactual exercises to understand the role of social policies in Europe. An excellent example of counterfactual analysis is the study of Clark and Leicester (2004) who gauge the contribution of British tax-bene…t reforms to the growth in income inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. 5 A few studies, like Nolan and Maitre (2000) for Ireland, suggest a meticulous investigation of policy changes and the way they interact with other factors to explain inequality changes. The present approach provides a framework to disentangle these e¤ects and to quantify the relative contribution of policy changes to variations in income distribution.
before taxes and bene…ts. 'Disposable income' is the household income that remains after payment of taxes/social contributions and receipt of all transfers; in the context of microsimulation studies, this is the relevant concept for measurement of poverty and inequality.
The distribution of disposable income is represented hereafter as a transformation d i (p j ; y l ) of the underlying population y l : 6 The distribution and nominal level of gross income as well as other characteristics like demographics are those of year l. We also consider the possibility to nominally adjust incomes to levels of year k using a parameter k . That is, k y l retains the structural characteristics of year l data (gross income inequality, demographics, etc.) but adopts the nominal level prevailing in year k. There are, however, some systematic di¤erences between microsimulation estimates of the distribution of income and those based directly on survey measures. In particular, full take-up of transfers is often assumed while there is evidence that non-take-up can be large, hence a quasi-systematic underestimation of poverty by the models (see Hancock et al., 2003) . Such di¤erences in levels of poverty need not, however, have much in ‡uence on analysis of changes in poverty such as that set out here.
We shall assume that the simulated distribution of disposable income d h (p h ; y h ) for a given year h is the true distribution for that year. Naturally, there are limits to this assumption. Mantovani and Sutherland (2003) Also, it must be kept in mind that tax-bene…t changes also a¤ect the distribution of gross income and demographics by changing incentives to work, save, have children, marry, etc. This study provides a …rst step in the assessment of pure policy e¤ects and therefore ignores these 'indirect'or secondary e¤ects. 7 
Decomposition
Characterize total change in the inequality/poverty index G between initial period 0 and …nal period 1 as:
This change in the distribution of disposable income -as summarized by index G -can be decomposed into the contribution of the change in the tax-bene…t policy ('policy e¤ect') and the contribution of other factors like variations in the underlying gross income distribution, in demographics, etc. ('data e¤ect').
Remark that a straightforward application of the initial (…nal) policy on the …nal (initial) data may not be correct. For instance, consider the following decomposition:
= (data e¤ect conditional on policy 1) + (policy e¤ect conditional on data 0)
This decomposition might be acceptable as a …rst approximation if initial and …nal years are close enough.
However, the term d 1 (p 1 ; y 0 ) indicates that we apply the system of year 1 to the data of year 0, ignoring the fact new monetary parameters (bene…t amounts, levels of tax allowance, etc.) may have been adjusted to account to some extent for price and wage in ‡ation over the period. For instance, the eligibility threshold of social bene…ts may have been adjusted in line with wage in ‡ation; in this case, the new system will appear more redistributive than it is if assessed on data 0 (that is, on lower gross income levels). It is thus necessary to evaluate the policy changes in the light of nominally adjusted data (see Callan et al., 2006) . To do so, we apply to both monetary parameters and income levels of year 0 the coe¢ cient 1 . The counterfactual 1 y 0 then corresponds to the distribution (and composition) of year 0 incomes nominally adjusted to year 1. As for parameters, the nominally adjusted schedule is written 1 p 0 . This is not equivalent to p 1 , that represents the actual set of parameters in year 1, i.e. as decided by the authorities. In e¤ect, as stated above, the actual parameters are not necessarily adjusted in line with progression in price or wages. The default option for what happens to welfare payment rates and tax 7 Nonetheless, the suggested approach could well be combined with behavioural models; in particular, it could incorporate labour supply responses in a partial equilibrium (see, among others, Creedy et al., 2006) or more complex e¤ects in a CGE framework. We ignore these e¤ects and isolate key issues which would also arise in such wider framework.
bands (the 'opening budget') varies a lot across countries. 8 Then we can suggest a …rst complete decomposition:
where the last term extracts the e¤ect of levelling up both the initial tax-bene…t monetary parameters and the initial incomes. Conditional on the policy structure of year 0, and for nominal levels of year 1, the second term corresponds to the change in data (underlying distribution of gross income, demographic structure, etc.). The …rst term captures the e¤ect of the tax-policy change over the period, conditional on …nal year data. Interestingly, and in line with our objective, it re ‡ects the change in policy structure
but also the actual change in nominal levels of monetary parameters (p 1 ) compared to a distributionally neutral situation where monetary parameters are exactly in line with average income growth over the period (
We also introduce the alternative decomposition where the e¤ect of policy changes is conditional on initial rather than …nal data. Here too, policy changes combine structural changes (from d 0 to d 1 ) and parameter changes (from 1 p 0 to p 1 ). Therefore, the policy e¤ect must be conditional on the initial data expressed in nominal levels of the …nal data. This yields the decomposition:
where the third term is unchanged compared to (1) . The …rst term is the e¤ect of other changes (gross income distribution, demographics, etc.) conditional on the policy structure and nominal levels of the …nal period.
We …nally discuss the choice of parameter . Notice …rst that governments have many options to uprate tax-bene…t parameters, as mentioned above. Three of them are fairly standard: (1) no uprating, rise to similar growth in real incomes across the income distribution, and is therefore a distributionallyneutral benchmark against which actual policy changes can be evaluated. 9 We opt here for a very similar backdrop where is de…ned as the actual change in average gross income levels between the years 0 and 1. This choice simply re ‡ects the fact that parameter is also used to nominally adjust the initial data ( 1 y 0 ) in order to assess the 'data e¤ect'in the above decompositions. For this purpose, it seems reasonable that y 1 and the counterfactual population 1 y 0 have the same average gross income. 10 
Homogeneity Property and Simpli…cation
We argue that the tax-bene…t system is often linearly homogenous, 11 that is:
Clearly, the adaptation of tax rules following the introduction of the Euro has been straightforward in most EU countries. This property can be illustrated by looking at an over-simpli…ed system that captures the essence of most tax-bene…t systems. Assume that the …rst instrument is a progressive tax schedule composed of two brackets with marginal rates t z and thresholds H z (z = 1; 2). A universal child bene…t grants an amount C for each child if household gross income is lower than a threshold F .
Finally, a minimum income is computed as a basic income B minus a proportion of other incomes.
Then disposable income of a household with income y and x children is:
Homogeneity is straightforward when multiplying income y and all monetary parameters B; H 2 ; H 1 ; F and C by the same coe¢ cient.
Consequently, a simultaneous change in nominal levels of both incomes and parameters should not a¤ect the relative location of households in the distribution of disposable income. Then, for well-behaved measures G of income distribution which do not change with nominal levels, the function G d should be homogenous so that:
9 Similar choices are made in Thoresen (2004) and Clark and Leicester (2004) who thoroughly analyze tax reforms in Norway and the UK respectively. 1 0 It would be possible to check the sensitivity of the absolute policy e¤ect to the indexation choice (income growth or in ‡ation), as done in Clark and Leicester (2004) . However, it would not make much sense, in our framework, to use price indexation. This choice would imply that the 'data e¤ect' in (1) or (2) captures more than the change in underlying population (gross income inequality, demographic structure, etc.). In e¤ect, it would also account for the di¤erence between price-indexed incomes ( 1 y 0 ) and actual incomes of the …nal period (y 1 ), introducing arti…cial di¤erences between actual and counterfactual data. 1 1 An interesting exception in Europe is the quadratic form of the German income tax system. and decompositions (1) and (2) simplify to:
Then the …rst term of (I) and the second of (II) are measures of the absolute e¤ect of the policy change on disposable income distribution against a distributionally-neutral situation. On practical grounds, the …rst measure requires the knowledge of data 1 while the second requires data 0. Typically, microsimulation studies use cross-sections of the initial year (year of data collection) while data of the …nal year are not available. This can be due to infrequency of data collection or simply the fact that period 1 corresponds to future budgets or hypothetical systems. In consequence, our …rst empirical exercise (Section 4) will apply the measure suggested by decomposition (II):
using base period data only.
Data and Simulation
Simulations for all countries except France and Ireland are performed using the tax-bene…t calculator EUROMOD. This model has been designed to simulate the tax-bene…t systems of the EU-15 countries. The data used to assess policy e¤ects in the next Section are described in Table 1 . As aforementioned, the absolute measure of the policy e¤ect using (II) requires data for the initial period only, that is, 1995 for France, 1994 for Ireland and 1998 for all the other countries. As indicated in Table 1 , however, the year of collection matches the initial year of simulation only for Austria, Finland, Germany, France and Ireland. For other countries, datasets are a bit older so that the previous methodology cannot be applied perfectly. For those, 1998 data are obtained by updating monetary variables using di¤erentiated coe¢ cients for di¤erent income sources -but necessarily assuming that there were no other changes (in gross income composition and distribution, in demographic structure, etc.) between the two years. The last column provides the updating coe¢ cient 1 that allows nominal adjustment between years 0 and 1 for all countries as previously described. It is calculated as the growth rate of average gross income over the relevant period.
The second exercise presented in Section 5 consists in applying the full decompositions to capture the relative e¤ect of policy changes. In this case, decompositions (I) and (II) require data for both initial and …nal periods. For that purpose, we focus on France and Ireland for which such data are available.
Initial data for France (1995) and Ireland (1994) are described in (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and France (1995 France ( -2001 ).
Absolute E¤ect of Tax-Bene…t Policies
Measure G could be chosen among many inequality and poverty indices. In this section, we simply use the Gini coe¢ cient to illustrate the methodology suggested above. Results are presented in First of all, the Gini for period 0, as calculated using microsimulation models, are broadly in line with other …ndings as indicated by the comparison of the …rst and last columns of Table 2 . For the UK, the main policy factors driving these changes were structural developments, particularly the extension in 1999 of the refundable tax credit for low-earner families with children. It may also re ‡ect substantial nominal adjustments: council taxes have been regularly raised above in ‡ation, a¤ecting more families with high incomes, and income support for pensioners has been increased. 13 In contrast, policy changes in Finland and Ireland have contributed to increase inequalities. In Finland, this is partly the result of a reduction in the progressivity of the tax system. In e¤ect, the ‡at-rate State tax has been increased while the progressive municipal taxation was decreased. Results
for Ireland -as well as for France -are explained in detailed in the next Section. In both countries, they cover a larger period than the 3-year span 1998-2001 used for other countries, which may partly explain that the change for Ireland is the largest in magnitude. Interestingly, Förster and d'Ercole (2005) study the overall change in the Gini during 1994-1999, which can be compared to the change in inequality due to the sole policy e¤ects as captured here for a similar period. It turns out that the equalising trend for France is reported in both studies while results are complete opposite for Ireland. Precisely, Förster and d'Ercole report a signi…cant decrease in inequality while we …nd that recent Irish policy developments must have contributed to increase the Gini. This means that the policy e¤ect and other factors must play in the same direction in France but in opposite ways in Ireland, a result which is con…rmed and more precisely quanti…ed in the next Section. Gini from other sources**
** Measures in Dennis and Guio (2003) are based on the ECHP for 1998 incomes; measures based on Danish register Data 1997 are published in the Luxembourg Income Study; those from 'Italian Household Budgets 1998' are published by the Bank of Italy (2000).
Gini on disposable income
Relative E¤ect of Tax-bene…t Policies: France and Ireland
In this section, we decompose the role of policy changes versus other factors in explaining changes in income distribution. Other factors are complex, including changes in the macroeconomic environment, the e¤ect of other policies (unemployment bene…ts, minimum wage, etc.) and the indirect e¤ect of taxbene…t policies via behavioural responses. We apply both decompositions I and II on France (period 1995-2001) and Ireland (period 1994 Ireland (period -2000 . Table 3 France. This re ‡ects that income growth has been more homogenous in France while inequality reduction has occurred mostly within the second half of the distribution in Ireland. This is con…rmed by the ratio of upper incomes to median, which decreases in Ireland while the gap between upper and lower incomes widens. In addition, the headcount ratio with poverty line at 60% of the median falls slightly in France but rises by around 50% in Ireland.
What is the relative role of tax-bene…t policy and of other factors in these developments? In France, policy changes explain most of the change in inequality and poverty measures; this result is con…rmed using either decomposition. Other factors play a small role, often not signi…cant or with a diverging sign depending on the index under consideration; in particular, they contribute to an increase in the headcount ratio with a line at 60% of the median but to a decrease in the headcount ratio with line at 50% (not represented) and in the Atkinson index with " = 1:5.
There While decompositions I and II lead to similar conclusions in France, results seem more sensitive to the method for Ireland. This is primarily due the fact that e¤ects are much larger in this country, following the dramatic change in the economy in the late 1990s and the very large fall in unemployment rate (from 15% to 5% over the period). Nevertheless, some key results are robust with respect to the choice of decomposition method. The Gini and Atkinson indices, along with the percentile ratios P90/P10 and P50/P10, con…rm that the direct in ‡uence of policy changes over the period was to increase inequality while other factors tended to decrease it. Both policy changes and other e¤ects contribute to increase the head count, poverty gap ratio and weighted poverty gap ratio with poverty line at 60% median as well as the Atkinson index with high inequality aversion.
As far as policy changes are concerned, income tax cuts have clearly reduced the progressivity of the system and contributed to widen the gap between the second half of the distribution and the bottom, as indicated by the percentile ratios. In addition, welfare payment rates have failed to keep pace with the growth in labour income so that the relative position of the poorest disimproved in the second half of 1990s, as translated by poverty trends. 15 As for other factors, not directly due to taxes and bene…ts, it turns out that the sharp fall in unemployment has acted to reduce most of the inequality measures. There is less indication of the widening in earnings dispersion which accompanied the rapid economic growth in the 1990s. As noted by Nolan and Maitre (2000), this trend has been primarily driven by relatively rapid increases for those at the very top of the distribution, which is not captured by the P90 percentile reported here. According to Nolan and Maitre, there was no indication that the bottom has been falling behind the median, as con…rmed here by the quasi-stagnation of the P50/P10 ratio for 'other e¤ects'. When the focus is on the poorest, however, the impact of these other factors was to raise the poverty indices (and the Akinson index with " = 1:5). Instances where falling unemployment has been associated with a rise in the risk of relative poverty have also been found in Immervoll et al. (2005a) . 
Concluding Comments
This paper suggests a decomposition of the trends in inequality and poverty into the contribution directly due to tax-bene…t policy changes and the contribution of other factors, including changes in gross income distribution. This allows us to establish an absolute measure of the policy e¤ect in which the benchmark is distributionally neutral, i.e. in line with income growth over the period. Policy changes which do not adjust monetary tax-bene…t parameters along these lines may a¤ect (disposable income) inequality.
While not unique, the measure proposed has the merit not requiring the data for the …nal year while being consistent with the suggested decomposition.
We also apply the full decomposition to two countries. We …nd that policy changes have had important in ‡uences in both Ireland and in France over the late 1990s. For France, policy impacts have tended to equalize incomes and reduce relative income poverty; for Ireland, the reverse is the case. In the Irish case, overall inequality falls because of other factors, including changes in the distribution of gross income as unemployment fell sharply. For France, policy changes were the main driving force in the change in inequality over this period. These results show the value of evaluating policy reforms in conjunction with other structural changes in the population if their in ‡uence on inequality is to be understood and measured accurately.
The objective of the analysis suggested for France and Ireland was primarily illustrative of the suggested methodology. Further research should focus on at least two aspects. First, a closer analysis of policy impacts would require the use of more regular (ideally, annual) data in order to assess more precisely the role of speci…c reforms, years after years, as performed for instance in Clark and Leicester (2004) . Second, results are potentially sensitive to the decomposition method, i.e. either based on the initial or the …nal underlying population. This is not the case for France, where overall e¤ects are small, but some di¤erences have been observed for Ireland and deserve further investigation. In particular, the regressive e¤ect of recent policy changes appears larger in absolute terms when estimated on the more equal distribution of gross income (i.e. on the …nal year using decomposition II).
